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FACIAL RECOGNITION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE 
WAKE OF CARPENTER V. UNITED STATES 
Matthew Doktor 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 By the time you are finished reading this sentence over 20,000 images 
were uploaded to social media—perhaps even an image of you.1 And by 
the end of this sentence, algorithms can produce an index with images of 
you and corresponding links.2 Private for-profit technology companies 
leverage those images and social media posts, scraped from public and 
private pages, to create databases searchable with facial recognition 
software.3 While police have used facial recognition for roughly twenty 
years, practical limitations restrained that technology.4 But with billions 
of images from Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter, and Instagram, 
this technology can now reveal historic records of a person's movement 
and associations.5 Despite the practical necessity of internet and social 
media participation in modern society, research shows that Americans are 
uncertain how to control that participation.6 
For the past century, rapidly developing technology has challenged the 
judiciary and legal scholars to adapt Fourth Amendment protections to 
the modern world. Early Fourth Amendment jurisprudence categorized 
police use of technology as non-searches.7 But recently the United States 
Supreme Court questioned that precedent in the face of novel surveillance 
 
 1. Rose Eveleth, How Many Photographs of You Are Out There in the World? ATLANTIC (Nov. 
2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/how-many-photographs-of-you-are-
out-there-in-the-world/413389 [https://perma.cc/V89M-W7JF]. 
 2. Anna Merlan, Here’s the File Clearview AI Has Keeping on Me, and Probably on You Too, 
VICE (Feb. 28, 2020, 7:58 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/5dmkyq/heres-the-file-clearview-ai-
has-been-keeping-on-me-and-probably-on-you-too [https://perma.cc/8XXA-XV9M]. 
 3. Clearview AI founder describes itself as a new research tool for law enforcement. Kashmir 
Hill, The Secretive Company that Might End Privacy as We Know It, N.Y. Times (Jan. 18, 2020, 6:17 
PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html 
[https://perma.cc/7VSE-N26K]. 
 4. Robinson Meyer, Who Owns Your Face?, ATLANTIC (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/07/how-good-facial-recognition-technology-
government-regulation/397289 [https://perma.cc/J6YK-8NYW]. 
 5. Kate Allen, Face Recognition App Used by Police, Until the Chief Found Out; Civil Liberty 
Association Slams Use of Controversial Clearview AI Technology, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 14, 2020., at A1. 
 6. Emily A. Vogels & Monica Anderson, Americans and Digital Knowledge, PEW RSCH. CTR.: 
INTERNET, SCI. & TECH (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/10/09/americans-and-
digital-knowledge/ (last visited Feb 22, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VEY9-34X2]. 
 7. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (finding no search in a wiretap 
of a telephone line absent physical trespass); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (finding no 
search of a wired informant who transmitted a conversation to a nearby agent because of the permission 
granted to the informant to enter the premises). 
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technologies.8 Scholars also warn that this technology threatens privacy 
rights.9  
At its core, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence reveals a reluctance to 
develop bright-line rules for police technology, at the expense of 
coherence and consistency. Instead the Court conceptualizes the Fourth 
Amendment and police technology primarily through an amorphous 
“reasonableness” standard.10 While the Court describes warrantless 
searches as per se unreasonable and “subject to only a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions,” rapidly developing 
surveillance technology often blurs these exceptions and forces the Court 
into doctrinal contortions.11 In turn, the lower courts are left to wade 
through inapposite doctrine to reconcile the factual contexts of each 
individual case.12 Because of that precedent, some commentators argue 
for First Amendment protections from facial recognition technology.13 
Recently, in Carpenter v. United States, the Court extended Fourth 
Amendment protections to third-party cell phone location data.14 The 
Court grappled with the imprecise fit of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and technology described as a “new phenomenon.”15 This Comment asks 
whether Carpenter extends Fourth Amendment protections to facial 
recognition searches of images mined from social media.  
Part I of this Comment examines the development of modern law 
enforcement technology in the age of social media and algorithms. Part II 
traces the history of Fourth Amendment privacy rights and digital 
surveillance leading to Carpenter. Finally, Part III argues for the 
expansion of the decision’s underlying principles to emerging facial 
recognition technology that leverages data derived from social media and 
internet usage.16 
 
 8. See generally Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 9. See Steven Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 262 (2002) (“These 
circumstances mean that efforts to revise privacy law to take account of the new technology will involve, 
in different areas of human activity, the balancing of values in light of predictions about the technological 
future.”); see also Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The “Smart” Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
547, 631 (2017) (“As new technologies develop in the Internet of Things and beyond, the hope is that 
these informational security principles can be applied to keep the Fourth Amendment smart enough to 
adapt to these challenges.”). 
 10. Cf. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). 
 11. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). 
 12. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 59 (1968). 
 13. Alexander T. Nguyen, Here’s Looking At You, Kid: Has Face-Recognition Technology 
Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, at nn. 45-48 (2002). 
 14. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206, 2214 (2018).  
 15. Id. at 2216. 
 16. Hill, supra note 3. 
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II. SURVEILLANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
On social media and the internet, privacy concerns quickly temper the 
allure of connectivity and immediacy. Facial recognition technology 
programmed on biometric data from images scraped from social media 
images poses a significant privacy challenge when private companies 
offer that technology to state actors. Ninety years after the Supreme Court 
first addressed wiretapping in Olmstead v. United States, electronic 
surveillance is a well-established fact of life.17 Because of this prevalence, 
Congress passed legislation to regulate electronic surveillance in 1968.18 
As society entered the digital and information ages, legislatures and 
judiciaries attempted to delineate the legality of electronic surveillance.19 
Early decisions rested on the foundation that the defendant "assumed the 
risk" with the use of the technology, determining that a person voluntarily 
conveying their information through internet-based platforms had no 
expectation of privacy.20   
In particular, federal courts have wrestled with government 
surveillance and data collection issues from social media accounts as 
early as 2011.21 While the courts are familiar with the Fourth Amendment 
implications of electronic surveillance, facial recognition technology is a 
novel issue with little authority addressing the constitutional issues with 
its use.22 Like facial recognition, data scraping and social media 
surveillance are comparatively recent developments that also threaten 
privacy rights. Together, these technologies compound privacy concerns. 
 
 17. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (finding no Fourth Amendment search 
in the wiretapping of a suspects phone in an investigation without a physical search of a person, home, 
effects, or papers). 
 18. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 regulated the circumstances and 
conditions in which oral and wire communications could be surveilled. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§  2510-2519 (1968)). 
 19. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (2010) (finding a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in emails sent and stored on third-party services as analogous to a phone call or a letter, and that 
compelled disclosure of internet service providers to surrender the contents of a subscriber's email address 
under the Stored Communications Act is a Fourth Amendment search requiring compliance with the 
warrant requirement).  
 20. See United States v. Bynum, 604 F.2d 161, 164 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979)).  
 21. See In re Application of The United States of America For An Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
2703(d)., 830 F. Supp. 2d 114, 131 (E.D. Va. 2011) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
I.P. address information conveyed by users to Twitter when they "chose to use the internet to communicate 
with the Twitter Service"). 
 22. See United States v. Jackson, No. 19-CR-60262CJS, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28200, at *32 
(W.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2020). 
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A. Web Scraping Social Media 
Web scraping, as a general practice, refers to the extraction and 
collection of internet content for archival, data analysis, information 
aggregation, and network mapping purposes.23 As social media users and 
user data grew, scraping that data from those users became increasingly 
profitable due to the impressive volume of user data uploaded to those 
platforms.24 Even more concerning, scraping can harvest data and images 
from search results.25 Those search engine results are indexed through 
express permissions granted to search engines by social media sites to 
access user information.26 And data analytics firms are able to access 
private Facebook user data through third-party applications contracts with 
the site.27  
Data analytics companies like HiQ represent an industry premised on 
access to data from social media member profiles.28 While that data can 
remain anonymous in the aggregate, some private entities harvest user 
images for the sole purpose of identifying the people in social media 
images.29 LinkedIn reported 90 million attempts to scrape data every day 
from its 50 million users.30 According to Facebook, third parties have 
scraped user data from most of its 2.2 billion profiles.31  
 As those industries demonstrate, social media is a cultural mainstay in 
American society. In the context of the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court explained that social media and the “modern internet” are the most 
powerful mechanisms for modern discourse, information, and 
connection.32 Approximately seventy percent of all U.S. adults use 
Facebook, while photo sharing platforms like Instagram and Snapchat are 
 
 23. Andrew Sellars, Twenty Years of Web Scraping And The Computer Fraud And Abuse Act, 24 
B.U. J. SCI & TECH. L. 372, 374 (2018) (explaining that web scraping has proliferated under the federal 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which was designed as an anti-hacking measure).  
 24. Thomas Lee, LinkedIn-HiQ Spat Raises Big Questions, S.F. CHRON., Jul. 9, 2017, at D1. 
 25. Jack Nicas, Facebook Says Russian Firms ‘Scraped’ Data, Some For Facial Recognition, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/technology/facebook-russian-scraping-
data.html [https://perma.cc/6CDC-SE3F]. 
 26. HiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 938 F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 27. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Social Media Sites Helped Police Track Minorities, 
ACLU Says, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 12, 2016, at 16. 
 28. Louise Matsakis, Scraping The Web Is A Powerful Tool. Clearview AI Abused It., WIRED (Jan. 
25, 2020), https://www.wired.com/story/clearview-ai-scraping-web/ [https://perma.cc/HT6Q-T6T9]. 
 29. Matt O’Brien, Facebook, YouTube: Firm Must Stop Scraping Faces From Sites, NBC BAY 
AREA (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/facebook-youtube-firm-must-stop-
scraping-faces-from-sites/2228373/ [https://perma.cc/59WN-DUFR]. 
 30. HiQ Labs, Inc., 938 F.3d at 991. 
 31. Barbara Ortutay, Facebook: Most Users May Have Had Public Data ‘Scraped’, AP NEWS 
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://apnews.com/4c5ee5ee573846b68e13e6c3a77b01bf/Facebook:-Most-users-may-
have-had-public-data-'scraped' [https://perma.cc/23VC-VHSF]. 
 32. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1738 (2017). 
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increasingly popular with teens and young adults.33 Research shows that 
Americans know their online activity is tracked, and sixty percent of 
Americans consider it impossible to go through daily life without having 
the government collect data about them.34  
B. Facial Recognition of Biometric Features 
While facial recognition technology dates back to the 1960s, modern 
artificial neural networks coupled with social media images accelerated 
the development of the algorithms that comprise facial recognition 
technology.35 At its core, a facial recognition tool determines whether an 
image contains a face, individual attributes, or a specific individual by 
comparing the biometric data in the image to existing photographs stored 
in a database.36  
Biometric data is the foundation of facial recognition technology. In its 
most basic form, biometrics refers to automated recognition of individuals 
based on biological characteristics—a face, iris, fingerprint, or voice.37 
Due to the permanence and personal nature of facial characteristics as a 
biometric identifier, biometric data reveals historic and biographical 
information depending on the application.38 Facial recognition algorithms 
train on biometric data and identify unique facial patterns, akin to a facial 
fingerprint, to create a “faceprint.”39  
As facial recognition remains unregulated technology, corporations, 
startups, and the government have developed facial recognition 
algorithms trained on private and public images.40 Federal investigators 
increasingly rely on facial recognition as a routine investigative tool, and 
state law enforcement deploys the tool on low-level crimes like check-
 
 33. Andrew Perrinn & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S. Adults Using Social Media, Including 
Facebook, Is Mostly Unchanged Since 2018, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-
facebook-is-mostly-unchanged-since-2018/ [https://perma.cc/A65N-6PXR]. 
 34. PEW RSCH. CTR., AMERICANS AND PRIVACY: CONCERNED, CONFUSED, AND FEELING LACK 
OF CONTROL OVER THEIR PERSONAL INFORMATION 3 (2019). 
 35. Lane Brown, There Will Be No Turning Back on Facial Recognition, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 12, 
2019),https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/11/the-future-of-facial-recognition-in-america.html 
[https://perma.cc/ND5K-AETH]. 
 36. Facial Recognition Technology: Ensuring Transparency in Government Use: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (Jun. 4, 2019) (statement of Dr. Charles H. Romine, 
Director of Information Laboratory, National Institute of Technology, Department of Commerce). 
 37. NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 18 
(Joseph N. Palto & Lynette L. Millett eds., 2010). 
 38. Id. at 111.  
 39. Abigail Tracy, Facebook Has Your Faceprint, Here's Why That Matters, FORBES (June 24, 
2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/abigailtracy/2015/06/24/facebook-has-your-faceprint-heres-why-
that-matters/#2294241d18eb [https://perma.cc/RBH7-8NKW]. 
 40. Brown, supra note 35. 
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cashing fraud and petty theft.41 The FBI and twenty-one state agency 
databases comprise a network of over 641 million photos from criminal 
justice databases, driver’s license photos, and visa applications.42 Yet, that 
massive image database and algorithms are limited due to the nature of 
the images of individuals directly facing the camera.43 From 2013 to 2018, 
the capability of facial recognition algorithms increased exponentially 
according to the National Institute for Standards and Technology.44  
But the reliability of facial recognition tools is questionable. Despite 
rapid technological improvements, vendors creating or executing this 
technology must navigate changes in facial appearance caused by aging 
and image quality.45 In one ACLU study, Amazon’s facial recognition 
tool “Rekognition” erroneously matched twenty-eight members of 
Congress to images from a 25,000 image mugshot database.46 Moreover, 
studies reveal that racial and gender biases permeate facial recognition 
technology: some commercial algorithms misclassify white women as 
men at a nineteen percent error rate and women of color as men as often 
as thirty-five percent of the time.47 Those error rates are especially 
concerning in light of government use of social media posts; for example, 
for surveillance of police brutality protests in Ferguson and Baltimore.48  
C. Automated and Systemic Surveillance 
Clearview AI, an artificial intelligence company, incorporated facial 
recognition, biometrics, and social media scraping to create a four billion 
image facial recognition database.49 The company then commercialized 
 
 41. Drew Harwell, FBI, ICE Find State Driver’s License Photos Are A Goldmine For Facial 
Recognition Searches, WASH. POST, Jul. 8, 2019, at A08. 
 42. Facial Recognition Technology: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 
116th Cong. (2019) (Statement of Gretta Goodwin, Director of Homeland Security and Justice). 
 43. Kashmir Hill, Face Scan App Inches Toward End of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2020, at 
A1. 
 44. Facial Recognition Technology: Ensuring Transparency in Government Use: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong. (Jun. 4, 2019) (statement of Dr. Charles H. Romine, 
Director of Information Laboratory, National Institute of Technology, Department of Commerce). 
 45. PATRICK GROTHER, ET. AL., DEPT. OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., 
ONGOING FACE RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST, NISTIR 8238 7 (2019), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2018/NIST.IR.8238.pdf.  
 46. Jason Murdock, Amazon Face Recognition Tech Matches 28 Members of Congress with 
Mugshots, NEWSWEEK (Jul. 27, 2018), https://www.newsweek.com/amazons-face-recognition-tool-
matches-28-members-congress-criminal-mugshots-1044850 [https://perma.cc/29GE-EPRR]. 
 47. Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in 
Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 8 (2018). 
 48. Craig Timberg & Elizabeth Dwoskin, Social Media Sites Helped Police Track Minorities, 
ACLU Says, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 12, 2016, at 16.  
 49. Tim Cushing, How Much Data Does Clearview Gather On People?, TECHDIRT (Mar. 27, 
2020), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20200324/17015544165/how-much-data-does-clearview-
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its database of images and the accompanying facial recognition algorithm 
through contracts with federal, state, and local agencies, and private 
citizens.50 Using scraped images, the facial recognition technology 
develops a biometric template for each face based on the unique facial 
geometry of each person.51 These user images were scraped in violation 
of the terms of service of the respective platforms. 52 Search results on the 
platform return all scraped photos connected to that biometric template 
with links to sites.53 As such, the search results can reveal every piece of 
information about a person that a person knowingly publishes, or what 
others have published about them. As law enforcement officials deploy 
Clearview’s algorithm in criminal investigations, the sensitive images are 
incorporated into the dataset.54  
This technology plays a larger role in law enforcement investigatory 
practices. Until recently, major technology companies abstained from 
combining these technologies over concerns of privacy and abuse.55 But 
in early 2019, Indiana State Police searched a smartphone video of a 
shooting in a public park against Clearview AI’s  database and instantly 
matched the shooter to social media images with links to Venmo, 
Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn profiles.56 In 2020, thousands of law 
enforcement departments use that or similar technology.57 In light of this 
widespread use and the racial biases inherent in this technology, it is no 
wonder that reports of wrongful arrests at the hands of facial recognition 
have begun to surface.58 
 
gather-people-answer-sadly-will-not-surprise-you.shtml [https://perma.cc/VS6P-5ZB6]. 
 50. Ryan Mac, Carolina Haskins, & Logan McDonald, Clearview AI Once Told Cops to “Run 
Wild” With its Facial Recognition Tool, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 28, 2020), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-cops-run-wild-facial-recognition-lawsuits 
[https://perma.cc/C7WA-HJPP]. 
 51. Jake Goldenfein, Australian Police are Using the Clearview AI Facial Recognition System 
with No Accountability, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 3, 2020), http://theconversation.com/australian-
police-are-using-the-clearview-ai-facial-recognition-system-with-no-accountability-132667 
[https://perma.cc/BK7M-25ZT]. 
 52. Aaron Mak, Clearview’s Terrifying Facial Recognition Can’t Go Back in the Bottle, SLATE 
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://slate.com/technology/2020/02/youtube-linkedin-and-others-serve-clearview-ai-
with-cease-and-desist-letters.html [https://perma.cc/U85Y-YYMK]. 
 53. Hill, supra note 43. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Kashmir Hill, Twitter Tells Facial Recognition Trailblazer to Stop Using Site’s Photos, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/22/technology/clearview-ai-twitter-letter.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5JM-ZK56]. 
 56. Hill, supra note 43. 
 57. Ryan Mac, Carolina Haskins, & Logan McDonald, Clearview’s Facial Recognition App Has 
Been Used by The Justice Department, ICE, Macy’s, Walmart, and the NBA , BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 
2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/clearview-ai-fbi-ice-global-law-enforcement 
[https://perma.cc/5R5Y-QF8C]. 
 58. Kashmir Hill, Facial Recognition Led to Black Man’s Arrest. It was Wrong., N.Y. TIMES, June 
25, 2020, at A1. 
7
Doktor: Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] FACIAL RECOGNITION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 559 
Illinois, Texas, and Washington regulated biometric data collection 
through legislation prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in 
Carpenter and reporting of Clearview AI’s capabilities. Illinois passed 
the Biometric Information Privacy Act out of concern over the inherent 
permanence of biometric features.59 The Illinois statute prohibits private 
companies from collecting biometric information without user consent.60 
Similarly, Washington requires notice and consent of the user before any 
biometric data is collected for a commercial purpose.61 Texas requires the 
same.62 Federal law relies on the 1986 Stored Communications Act to 
generally regulate electronic communication records.63 Under that law, a 
federal court only needs to find facts showing a reasonable ground to 
believe that the content of digital communications is relevant to a criminal 
investigation.64 
As facial recognition and biometric algorithms become more 
sophisticated, and social media further ingrains itself into societal fabric, 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has slowly recognized the privacy 
implications of digital surveillance. The important focus on the principles 
underlying Fourth Amendment protections implicates privacy concerns 
related to emerging digital surveillance technology. The willingness of 
the Supreme Court to incorporate modern technology into its 
Constitutional doctrine has led to incongruous and winding results. Part 
II explores those results. 
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” of “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”65 American 
jurisprudence delineates between searches and non-searches as a 
gatekeeping function for that Constitutional right. This Part examines the 
application of Fourth Amendment protections to surveillance technology 
by the United States Supreme Court. First, this Part outlines the 
limitations placed on Fourth Amendment protections when a person 
knowingly exposes information to a third-party. Next, this Part surveys 
 
 59. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 / 5 (2018). 
 60. Matthew Kulger, Does It Hurt You if Your Face is Tracked by Technology?, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 
28, 2018, at C18. 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375.020 (2019). 
 62. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503 (West 2019).  
 63. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703.  
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). 
 65. U.S. Const. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). 
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the line of Supreme Court cases that limit Fourth Amendment protections 
when a person knowingly exposes a fact to the public. Finally, this Part 
examines the evolution of Fourth Amendment privacy interests in the 
digital age, culminating in a recent watershed opinion in United States v. 
Carpenter.  
In Katz v. United States, the Court explained Fourth Amendment 
protections govern “people, not places.”66 Justice Harlan’s concurrence to 
the majority opinion set forth two threshold requirements for Fourth 
Amendment searches: first, whether an individual had a subjective 
expectation of privacy; and second, whether there was a societal objective 
expectation of privacy.67 In Katz, the Court concluded that stereophonic 
tape recorders attached to a phone booth to eavesdrop on Charlie Katz’s 
phone calls constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.68 That conclusion rested on the “vital role” of public 
telephones within society and acknowledged the shifting societal norms 
predicated on entrenched technology.69 But Fourth Amendment 
protections were considered inapplicable to information that a person 
“knowingly exposes to the public.”70  
A. Knowing Exposure to Third Parties 
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a categorical exception 
to Fourth Amendment protections when a person reveals information to 
the public under the "third-party doctrine." According to the third-party 
doctrine, American citizens have no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information willingly exposed.71 As a result, law enforcement agencies 
 
 66. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). In a prior decision, the Supreme Court 
narrowed Fourth Amendment protections to “material things” based on the plain language of the 
amendment and held police wiretapping outside was not a search within the Court’s understanding. 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to 
be of material things -- the person, the house, his papers or his effects.”). 
 67. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“there is a twofold requirement, first that a 
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be 
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.”). 
 68. Id. at 353. One significant aspect of Katz is the Court's departure from its Fourth Amendment 
surveillance precedent. Katz departed from the “eroded underpinnings” of Olmstead v. United States and 
Goldman v. United States, Fourth Amendment cases controlled by the trespass doctrine.   
 69. Id.at 352. 
 70. Id. at 351. That same year, the Court struck down New York’s permissive eaves dropping 
statute as a violation of the Fourth Amendment in Berger v. New York.  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 44 (1967). In Berger, the Court recognized the fervor of the law enforcement community, which 
considered telephone surveillance “the most important technique of law enforcement.”  Id. at 60. 
 71. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone, petitioner 
voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to 
its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company 
would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.”). 
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acquiring information known to an informant or held by a business is 
considered “not a search” in the eyes of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence.72 While this doctrine grew out of government use of 
confidential informants, police technology has created an amorphous 
doctrine with contradictory rulings.73 According to Professor Richard 
Uviller, the Court’s interpretation of privacy expectation hinges on the 
degrees of awareness on the part of the surveilled and that the invisible 
agent in Katz is wholly distinct from the “visible” undercover agent.74  
Similarly, the Court in Smith v. Maryland found no Fourth Amendment 
search when police installed a pen register in a telephone company’s 
central office to record the numbers dialed by defendant Michael Lee 
Smith.75 Under the guise of the defendant “assuming the risk” of 
information voluntarily turned over to third-parties and the “limited 
capabilities” of the recording technology, the Court found no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that Americans dial.76  
Dissenters and legal scholars have questioned the underlying premise 
and societal expectations promulgated under the third-party doctrine.77 
Professor Sherry Colb questioned the “knowingly exposed” element of 
the third-party doctrine when the government “deliberately manipulates 
 
 72. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 73. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747 (1971) (“On four occasions the conversations 
took place in Jackson's home; each of these conversations was overheard by an agent concealed in a 
kitchen closet with Jackson's consent and by a second agent outside the house using a radio receiver. Four 
other conversations -- one in respondent's home, one in a restaurant, and two in Jackson's car -- were 
overheard by the use of radio equipment.”). 
 74. H. Richard Uviller, Evidence From The Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of 
the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1151 (1987) (“The law treats secret 
surveillance of speech or other behavior largely according to whether the surveilling agent is visible or 
invisible to the subject. An agent, visibly present though masquerading, is thought to gather evidence in 
a fundamentally different manner than a concealed agent or a hidden electronic device. The theory is that 
the contents of the mind, deliberately revealed to another person, are willingly shared, while the secret 
eye or ear, possibly electronically enhanced, bypasses constitutional concern to spirit the evidence 
away.”). 
 75. Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46 (finding “no actual expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he 
dialed, and that, even if he did, his expectation was not "legitimate." The installation and use of a pen 
register, consequently, was not a "search," and no warrant was required.”). 
 76. Id. at 742 ("we doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the 
numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must "convey" phone numbers to the telephone 
company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All 
subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the 
numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”). 
 77. Id. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Smith v. Maryland, Justice Marshall disagreed on two 
principles.  First, inherent in participation in modern society is the practical necessity of modern 
communication, that necessity forces members of society into the risk of disclosure.  Second, Justice 
Marshall framed the assumption of risk on what privacy expectation should be held in light of a “free and 
open society” and cautioned that  “unless a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become 
a personal or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance.” Id.  
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reality to create relationships for the sole purpose of betrayal."78 Some 
scholars see the Court’s third-party doctrine as permitting government 
intrusion into homes and lives through “a legion of spies,” while, at the 
same time, decrying state agents who walk into our homes and rifle 
through our drawers.79  
B. Knowing Exposure to the Public 
What a government agent observes in public is presumptively not a 
search and is not protected by the Fourth Amendment.80 The Court is 
reluctant to force “law enforcement officers to shield their eyes” in 
public.81 Because a person exposes information, that person has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet again, technology forces the Court 
to contort the boundaries of what is and is not a search of a person’s public 
activities. Two cases illustrate the slight distinctions that lead to 
incongruous Fourth Amendment protections: United States v. Knotts and 
United States v. Karo. 
In Knotts, police officers installed a beeper in a drum of chloroform 
that they believed Leroy Knotts and Darryl Petschen would use to 
manufacture amphetamines.82 Officers then tracked the beeper’s signal by 
car and helicopter as Petschun drove the chloroform drum and beeper to 
a cabin where, after obtaining a search warrant, police discovered an 
amphetamine laboratory.83 The Court analyzed the surveillance by 
removing the technology from the equation. First, the Court equated the 
use of the beeper to police following a car on public streets and 
highways.84 As a result, the Court found no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a person’s movements because that information is voluntarily 
conveyed to “anyone who wanted to look.”85 Then, the Court 
acknowledged the beeper but disregarded its role, reasoning that the 
Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from using sensory 
augmented technology, finding support in a 1927 decision involving a 
flashlight.86  
One year later, in United States v. Karo, the Court ruled that police use 
 
 78. Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and 
Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN L. REV 119, 141 (2003).  
 79. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 365 
(1974). 
 80. See generally United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
 81. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).  
 82. United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 516 (8th Cir.1981). 
 83. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279 (1983). 
 84. Id. at 281. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 282 (quoting United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927)). 
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of a beeper to monitor a suspect's movements through a home was 
unconstitutional.87 In contrast to Knotts, the Court held the surveillance 
violated the reasonable expectation of privacy and infringed on the 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.88 The Court distinguished its 
decision on grounds that the beeper was monitored within the house and 
revealed “a critical fact about the interior of the premises.”89 The Court 
honed in on the fact that the record in Knotts was unclear about whether 
the beeper was monitored inside the cabin, whereas in Karo the police 
conceded that they monitored the beeper in the interior of the home.90 
C. Adjudicating Privacy in the Digital Age: Kyllo, Jones, then 
Carpenter 
In a series of police-technology search cases, the Court acknowledged 
the awkward fit between Fourth Amendment precedent and technology. 
First, in Kyllo v. United States the Court considered the constitutionality 
of government agents conducting warrantless thermal scans of homes 
with a thermal imager.91 Thermal scans of the exterior of a suspect's 
apartment detected heat emanating from halide lights to grow 
marijuana.92 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded there 
was no Fourth Amendment violation for two reasons: there was no 
subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emanating from a home and 
there was no objective expectation of privacy in the hot spots on the roof 
and wall of the home.93  
The Supreme Court disagreed that the thermal imaging was a non-
invasive scan of the exterior of the house.94  Instead, the Court's holding 
was premised on the “sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development” that, if left unregulated, would hold citizens at the mercy 
of advancing technology.95 Next, the Court refused to hinge a rule on 
whether or not the surveillance would access “intimate” details due the 
evolving nature of technology.96 But that same technology employed 
within a suspect’s home mandated a bright and firm line, that technology 
not in the public use implemented to reveal information about the home 
 
 87. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 709 (1984). 
 88. See id. at 716. 
 89. Id. at 715. 
 90. Id. at 714. 
 91. Kyllo v. United States, 553 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).  
 92. Id. at 30.  
 93. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir.1999). 
 94. Kyllo, 553 U.S. at 35.  
 95. Id. at 36. 
 96. Id. at 39. 
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is a search that requires warrant.97 
Then, in United States v. Jones the Court revisited the privacy 
implications of Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking devices on a 
suspect’s car. In Jones, police installed a device on the undercarriage of 
Antoine Jones’ jeep, which resulted in 2,000 pages of data from four 
weeks of surveillance.98 The Jones majority opinion returned to a 
historical trespass analysis and held the physical installation of the device 
was a trespass, and therefore, a Fourth Amendment violation.99  
In the concurrences, a new understanding for Fourth Amendment rights 
in the digital era emerged. In his concurring opinion, Justice Alito noted 
the impossibility of an eighteenth century analogue to the installation of 
the GPS tracker and rebuked the reliance on eighteenth century tort law 
to analyze twenty-first century Fourth Amendment issues.100 Instead, his 
concurrence focused on long-term surveillance and the current landscape 
of technologies that facilitate long-term surveillance.101  Furthermore, 
technology has erased most, if not all, practical limitations on long-term 
surveillance.102 While claiming the legislature as the proper body to 
ensure the protections of privacy rights, he found a reasonable expectation 
of privacy under Katz in long-term monitoring and cataloguing of public 
movements.103 
Justice Sotomayor also signaled the need for a new Fourth Amendment 
doctrine in light of the emerging technological capabilities of the 
government. In her concurring opinion, she noted that the questions 
surrounding reasonable expectations of privacy hinge on whether citizens 
reasonably expect the government to collect and store data that implicates 
the private details of their lives.104 While GPS data was the central theme 
of her concurrence, focusing on the collection of “aggregate data” 
implicates the multitude of devices and technologies referenced in Justice 
 
 97. Id. at 40. 
 98. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).  
 99. Id. at 405. 
 100. Id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring) (“is it possible to imagine a case in which a constable secreted 
himself somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor the movements 
of the coach’s owner?”). 
 101. Id. at 428 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring 
is becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection systems create a precise record of 
the movements of motorists who choose to make use of that convenience. Many motorists purchase cars 
that are equipped with devices that permit a central station to ascertain the car's location at any time so 
that roadside assistance may be provided if needed and the car may be found if it is stolen. Perhaps most 
significant, cell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record the 
location of users--and as of June 2011, it has been reported, there were more than 322 million wireless 
devices in use in the United States.”). 
 102. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 103. Id. at 431 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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Alito’s concurrence.105 Finally, Justice Sotomayor questioned the 
propriety of the third-party doctrine in the digital age as “people reveal a 
great deal of information about themselves to third parties” while carrying 
out unremarkable tasks.106 While she concurred in the judgement, she 
urged the Court to decouple privacy from secrecy, and cautioned that all 
public actions should not forfeit an underlying privacy right.107 
1. Carpenter v. United States: Privacy and Digital Monitoring of the 
Whole of our Movements   
The Court grappled with the very issues raised by the Jones 
concurrences in Carpenter v. United States—specifically, long-term data 
collection tracking a person’s every movement.108 In Carpenter, police 
accessed over 130 days’ worth of cell-site location information (CSLI) 
data109 from Timothy Carpenter’s cell phone provider, equaling roughly 
13,000 location points to track him.110 Writing for the Majority, Justice 
Roberts attempted to redefine the “reasonable expectation of privacy” in 
the digital age without complete abandonment of Fourth Amendment 
precedent. Adopting Justice Alito’s language of surreptitious monitoring 
and Justice Sotomayor’s long-term data collection concerns in their 
respective Jones concurrences, Justice Roberts concluded that the use of 
historic CSLI data to track Carpenter violated the “reasonable expectation 
[of privacy] in the whole of his physical movements.”111 
Despite framing Carpenter as a narrow holding, the decision may have 
broad implications. While the Court refused to explicitly overrule the 
third-party doctrine of Smith v. Maryland and United States v. Miller, the 
Carpenter opinion disqualified that doctrine from the “novel 
circumstances” of CSLI data, concluding that third-party disclosure does 
not preclude Fourth Amendment protections.112 Given the widespread use 
of cell phones in the United States and the “seismic shifts in digital 
technology” that make detailed chronicles of a person’s physical presence 
 
 105. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their 
movements will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, more 
or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on."). 
 106. Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 107. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 108. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2019). 
 109. See id. (“Most modern devices, such as smart phones, tap into the wireless network several 
times a minute whenever their signal is on, even if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features. 
Each time the phone connects to a cell site, it generates a time-stamped record known as cell-site location 
information (CSLI).”). 
 110. Id. at 2212. 
 111. Id. at 2219. 
 112. Id. at 2217. 
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over the course of years, the Court reasoned that there was a “world of 
difference” between CSLI data and the seemingly primitive technology 
in Smith.113  
2. Carpenter’s Aftermath 
In the wake of Carpenter, several lower federal courts have extended 
Fourth Amendment protections beyond historic CSLI data.114 One district 
court within the Tenth Circuit relied on Carpenter to find a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a generally public Facebook account.115 The 
court considered a warrant granting access to the entire Facebook profile 
overbroad due to the pervasive nature of the data the account would 
reveal. Finally, the court compared a search of the entire Facebook 
account to a general warrant for rummaging through the entirety of a 
person’s electronic belongings.116  
Likewise, a Fourth Circuit district court extended the reasoning in 
Carpenter to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in non-public 
Facebook content.117 The court likened social media posts to sealed 
packages and private calls entrusted to an intermediary to deliver the 
information and found the third-party doctrine inapplicable.118 According 
to the court, recognizing the manner in which technology enables the 
government’s ability to encroach on private areas in our lives requires 
protection of social media accounts due to the intimate, momentous, and 
weighty information conveyed through those sites.119 However, even in 
the aftermath of Carpenter, some lower courts dismiss the notion of any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in social media posts.120 
In 2019, the Ninth Circuit relied on Carpenter to determine whether 
biometric data collection for facial recognition technology harmed social 
media users’ privacy rights.121 Facebook’s facial recognition software 
employs biometric face templates to identify users from the millions of 
photos uploaded to Facebook for photo and location tagging.122 The court 
 
 113. Id. at 2219-20. 
 114. See generally United States v. Diggs, 385 F. Supp. 3d 648 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (extending 
Carpenter to GPS data that tracked the defendant’s movements over the course of a month). 
 115. United States v. Irving, 347 F. Supp. 3d 615, 621 (D. Kan. 2018). 
 116. Id. at 624. 
 117. United States v. Chavez, 423 F. Supp. 3d 194, 202 (W.D. N.C. 2019). 
 118. Id. at 203.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Ward v. City of Hobbs, 398 F. Supp. 3d 991, 1073 (N.M. 2019) (“regardless of what the 
Supreme Court decides to do with social media on the internet, only the most ignorant or gullible think 
that what they post on the internet is or remains private.”). 
 121. Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1273 (9th Cir. 2019).  
 122. Id.  
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concluded that biometric privacy rights are akin to the rights protected in 
Carpenter due to the “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled” 
nature of the information revealed by facial recognition technology.123 
The court considered future development and application of the 
technology, cautioning against facial recognition scans of real-time 
surveillance data and biometric templates being used to unlock password 
protected phones through the facial recognition lock.124  
Similarly, a district court within the Ninth Circuit relied on Carpenter 
to find that the use of biometric face scans of a suspect to access his smart 
phone violated the Fifth Amendment.125 The court differentiated 
biometric data from fingerprinting and DNA swabs because of the manner 
of identification and access to a database of a person’s most intimate 
information.126  
Focusing on the nature of the data, some federal courts have shown a 
willingness to extend Fourth Amendment protections to information that 
is encyclopedic and intimate. Furthermore, these cases demonstrate the 
looming issues in the aftermath of Carpenter. These cases also 
demonstrate the degree to which courts are confronting policing 
technology and the privacy implications implicit in Clearview AI’s 
platform. With Carpenter as a guidepost courts will need to address the 
tension between Fourth Amendment privacy expectations and access to 
databases like Clearview AI’s. 
III. EXTENDING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The preceding Parts of this Comment highlighted the questions and 
challenges that courts will face regarding biometric privacy rights and the 
Fourth Amendment in the wake of Carpenter. On one hand, Carpenter 
cabined its holding as a narrow decision.127 On the other hand, the lower 
courts are already extending Carpenter to novel circumstances. In the 
meantime, national attention has focused on the digital privacy rights 
implicated by a multi-billion image database harvested from social media 
sites that are practically inseparable from modern life.   
Answering those questions requires an application of the guideposts set 
forth in Carpenter. First, this Part applies state use of facial recognition 
scans of biometric databases to the third-party doctrine as understood in 
Carpenter. It then turns on the subjective expectation of privacy in a 
person’s biometric data. Finally, this Part identifies an objective 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. See In re The Search of a Residence in Oakland, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 126. Id. at 1016. 
 127. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018).  
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/10
568 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
expectation of privacy in a person’s biometric data as currently used in 
Clearview AI’s database.  
The Article concludes by arguing that Fourth Amendment prohibition 
on unreasonable searches should extend protection to an individual's 
biometric data as a natural extension of Supreme Court jurisprudence and 
as a matter of policy. Facial recognition scans of biometric data harvested 
by third-parties, as a modern surveillance technology, renders the third-
party doctrine anachronistic. Like CSLI data, facial recognition scans of 
biometric data intrude into a sphere of privacy that merits protection 
through the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.128  
A. Unreasonable: The Third-Party Doctrine 
As a threshold matter, the third-party doctrine is particularly 
inappropriate in the context of facial recognition searches of biometric 
data due to the nature of an individual’s biometric data. Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence historically prohibits intrusions into the 
human body.129 While the technology is predicated on the user images 
uploaded to social media platforms and internet sites, the scan and map 
of facial geometry is distinguishable from the user image itself.130 The 
user image itself becomes ancillary as the technology extracts the facial 
features and formats them into a face print.131 Just as the thermal scan of 
the house in Kyllo was not the same as officers on a public street observing 
a home with the naked eye, facial recognition searches of biometric 
databases are not naked-eye reviews of user photographs.132  
Social media platforms predicated on user interactions and 
connectivity developed the capacity to map the biometric data of user 
images to enable user tags, suggest content, and target advertisements, 
among other functions.133 Few could have imagined a society in which a 
person's daily life and intimate relationships are indexed and searchable 
in the matter of seconds in 2009, let alone in 1979 when Smith and Miller 
articulated the third-party doctrine.134 But the unimaginable became 
 
 128. Id. at 2213. 
 129. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (“[With respect to searches 
involving intrusions beyond the body’s surface[, t]he interests in human dignity and privacy which the 
Fourth Amendment protects forbid any intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be 
obtained.”).  
 130. See infra pp. 5-6. 
 131. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FBI FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, GAO-16-
267 6 n.14 (2016). 
 132. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
 133. Joaquin Quinero Candela, Managing Your Identity on Facebook With Face Recognition 
Technology, FACEBOOK (Dec. 19, 2017), https://about.fb.com/news/2017/12/managing-your-identity-on-
facebook-with-face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/7G6M-R2FU]. 
 134. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) ("After all, when Smith was 
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reality due to the rise of social media and rapid developments in facial 
recognition technology.135 
What's more, voluntary exposure is inapplicable to biometric face 
prints because, like the CSLI in Carpenter, that data is not truly "shared" 
as the term is normally understood.136 The biometric data used by 
Clearview AI was never "voluntarily conveyed" to them in any sense—it 
was web-scraped.137 Clearview AI’s situation is wholly distinct from 
Miller, where a company voluntarily conveyed information to the 
government.138 Rather, social media platforms and other websites scraped 
by Clearview AI have actively sought to halt that practice.139 
As an increasingly indispensable aspect of participation in society, 
social media and the internet are "pervasive and insistent part[s] of daily 
life."140 While most Americans understand the pervasive nature of data 
collection and commodification online, most feel they have little to no 
control over their personal data.141 Carpenter recognized that user data 
increasingly stems from passive collection through the cell phone 
applications.142 Moreover, individual users lack control over data stored 
on other user accounts.143 Combined with web scraping, the permanence 
of data creates a digital paper trail left behind for algorithms to follow. 
As such, the same principles underlying the Carpenter decision 
preclude application of the third-party doctrine to the biometric data upon 
which facial recognition algorithms rely.  
 
decided in 1979, few could have imagined a society in which a phone goes wherever its owner goes, 
conveying to the wireless carrier not just dialed digits, but a detailed and comprehensive record of the 
person's movements."). 
 135. See infra pp. 4-6. 
 136. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2210. 
 137. See infra pp 3 –5. 
 138. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 139. Mak, supra note 52. 
 140. Carpenter, 138 S.Ct. at 2219 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 283 (2014). 
 141. Brook Auxier, Lee Rainie, Monica Anderson, Andrew Perrin, Madhu Kamar, & Erica Turner, 
Americans and Privacy: Concerned, Confused and Feeling Lack of Control Over Their Personal 
Information, PEW RSCH. CTR.  (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-and-privacy-concerned-confused-and-
feeling-lack-of-control-over-their-personal-information [https://perma.cc/72RW-97VQ].  
 142. Kim Komando, You're Not Paranoid: Your Phone Really is Listening In, USA TODAY (Dec. 
19, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2019/12/19/your-smartphone-mobile-device-
may-recording-everything-you-say/4403829002/ [https://perma.cc/8936-TCMK]; Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2220 ("Virtually any activity on the phone generates CSLI, including incoming calls, texts, or e-mails 
and countless other data connections that a phone automatically makes when checking for news, weather, 
or social media updates."). 
 143. Nicole Karlis, You Just Deleted Facebook. Can You Trust Facebook to Delete Your Data? , 
SALON (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.salon.com/2019/02/10/you-just-deleted-facebook-can-you-trust-
facebook-to-delete-your-data/ [https://perma.cc/P46K-TGLR].  
18
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss2/10
570 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
B. Reasonable: Expectations of Biometric Privacy 
The Fourth Amendment secures the right of the people to be “secure in 
their persons.” This constrains unjustified bodily intrusions on the mere 
chance evidence might be obtained.144 And courts have long recognized 
that the collection and analysis of biological samples is a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.145 State use of biometric databases like Clearview 
AI’s intrude beyond the skin to measure and map the human body based 
on biological characteristics.146 Fingerprinting and buccal swabs of 
suspects have been upheld in the context of custodial booking procedures, 
but in the context of a for-profit biometric database of web-scraped 
images, the inherent government interest in booking procedures is 
inapplicable.147  
Nor does this technology fall within the category of searches that are 
reasonable due to the “minimal intrusion.” Admittedly, biometric 
mapping of a photograph is far less physically invasive than, for example, 
compelled surgery; but a person’s individual dignitary interests in 
personal privacy are nonetheless implicated.148 Yet, the ease at which the 
Clearview AI database was created implicates fundamental privacy and 
security concerns, particularly because of the surreptitious nature of the 
image collection and the absence of any mechanism to give or withdraw 
consent. 
Unlike fingerprinting, facial recognition searches of biometric 
databases probe into the individual’s private life and thoughts.149 Within 
seconds of uploading an image, the technology can identify a person, 
reveal which social media accounts that person is on, and provide access 
to a catalogue of images of that person along with links to web addresses 
where they appeared.150 Given the intimate nature of social media use and 
the ubiquity of social media in society, that catalogue can potentially 
provide a pictorial timeline for the user. One Facebook user's data alone 
 
 144. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767–68 (1966). 
 145. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989). 
 146. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FBI FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY, GAO-16-
267 5 (2016). 
 147. See generally Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).  
 148. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985). 
 149. United States v. Davis, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (“[F]ingerprinting may constitute a much 
less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions. 
Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individuals private life and thoughts that marks an 
interrogation or search.”); See also Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148 (2013) citing Winston v. Lee, 
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is the equivalent of 400,000 pages of Microsoft Word documents.151 That 
data can include a person’s historic location, social, political, and 
biographical information. Even before Carpenter, the Sixth Circuit found 
a reasonable expectation that emails would be shielded from outside 
scrutiny because of the “sensitive and sometimes damning substance” of 
emails, which implies an expectation that emails are private and not 
public.152  
This technology necessarily implicates broad privacy interests that 
society has deemed reasonable. As the courts in the Ninth Circuit have 
explained, a person’s biometric data is detailed, encyclopedic, and 
effortlessly compiled.153 The capability of Clearview AI’s facial 
recognition scans of a person's biometric data implicates a person's history 
through the results of biometric queries. While the Supreme Court's 
caution surrounded the privacy implications of CSLI data chronicling an 
individual's physical movements, biometric data implicates intimate 
details of a person's life beyond their physical location or the heat 
radiating from their home.154 As a whole, government access to a database 
of harvested images for the purposes of scanning the biometric faceprints 
defies society’s expectation that law enforcement will not secretly 
monitor and catalog an individual’s life.155  
According to the Supreme Court, "the degree of community resentment 
aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assessment of the 
quality of intrusion upon reasonable expectations of personal security."156 
In the very active and fervent debate surrounding Clearview AI’s 
platform, multiple cities have banned the use of facial recognition and 
state legislative initiatives regulate this type of technology. New Jersey 
prohibited police use of the Clearview AI through the Attorney General’s 
office.157 In response to public awareness and opposition to the 
technology, some law enforcement agencies have banned its use 
altogether.158 Cities like San Francisco, Oakland, and Somerville passed 
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ordinances in 2019 prohibiting the use of facial recognition and other 
surveillance technologies.159 While those cities restrict the use of that 
technology, other cities like Chicago use it without any oversight, 
approval, or public input.160 Furthermore, New York City police have 
defended the use of the technology as merely an investigative lead, but 
less than probable cause.161 Other law enforcement officials acknowledge 
the need to regulate the practice, but reject outright prohibition due to 
public safety needs.162 
On the federal side, two U.S. Senators probed Clearview AI over its 
practices while the House of Representatives held hearings on the impact 
of facial recognition technology on civil rights and liberties.163 Those 
hearings demonstrated strong bipartisan support for transparency and 
accountability for the use of facial recognition technology in the U.S.164  
Proponents of facial recognition technology defend its use as a research 
tool to identify perpetrators and victims of crimes, and argue that police 
should be able to use “every tool available” to find suspects and bring 
them to justice.165 Yet even the most efficacious law enforcement 
practices are subject to constitutional scrutiny—"the enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the 
table."166 While the United States Supreme Court has disfavored bright-
line rules, it has refused to leave reasonable expectations of privacy at the 
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mercy of advancing police technology that would allow police to discern 
all human activity.167 In those cases, it has drawn firm and bright lines 
that require a warrant for the use of particular surveillance methods.  
Electronic privacy rights advocates urge a complete prohibition on the 
technology.168 As it stands, there is not a single viable basis for monitoring 
unconstitutional biometric searches of individuals through facial 
recognition technology. As a matter of policy, concrete mechanisms 
protecting the constitutional right to privacy must deter abuse of this 
technology. At a minimum, before running a facial recognition search 
against a biometric database like Clearview AI’s, law enforcement should 
follow the basic the Fourth Amendment directive: get a warrant. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This account of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shines a light on the 
constitutional tensions surrounding police use of facial recognition 
technology. The history illuminates the United States Supreme Court’s 
tumultuous relationship with privacy rights in the surveillance age. The 
sophistication of policing technology has far outpaced the reasoning of 
the courts. As modern Fourth Amendment decisions illustrate, the Court 
has recently shown a willingness to reconsider ill-fitting precedent in light 
of modern surveillance technology. In the age of Carpenter, Fourth 
Amendment protections should extend to an individual's biometric data. 
But perhaps the clearest lesson is how unclear Fourth Amendment 
protections are. The technology at the fingertips of Americans today, like 
the constitutional amendments that the technology implicates, is 
vexatious and intractable. There is no question that courts have tried to 
balance legitimate policing needs with constitutional protections. While 
the United States Supreme Court's decisions attempt to reflect the privacy 
expectations of the nation, in an important sense, its decisions have 
molded the expectations of law enforcement and civilians. The Court in 
Carpenter may have conditioned its holding as a "narrow one" to avoid 
disturbing both the past and the future.169 But that decision did not make 
the question of Fourth Amendment protections in the digital surveillance 
era disappear. In fact, that question is now more urgent than ever. The 
digital age, the universality of social media, the more than three billion 
social media images scraped, the acceleration of facial recognition 
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technology, and the onset of digital surveillance companies have only 
escalated the tensions of Fourth Amendment privacy expectations. If the 
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